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First I want to thank Prof. Fleming for his detailed, thoughtful, and
thought-provoking remarks, and particularly for his generous advice on how
to improve successive versions of the conference paper presented here in its
final form. While our continuing correspondence has led to something of a
convergence of views, there are several differences of opinion that resist this
reconciliation. In this reply I will present my side of two of these remaining
disputes, which are particularly relevant for understanding how accepting
my account of event time observables (sketched in the final section of the
paper) leads to a distinctive view of quantum theory. The core of what is
distinctive about my view is that it restores a certain symmetry between
time and space with respect to what is observable according to the theory.
The empirical motivation for this view is that often the outcomes of an
experiment may be located in time as well as in space. The theoretical
consequence of this view is that time covariant POVMs must be provided
which have this specific empirical interpretation.
1 On What is Located Where, and Whence
I think that both Prof. Fleming and I agree that ‘standard QM’ (i.e. the
Dirac-von Neumann formalism) is ill-equipped to supply observables that
apply not to an instant of time but an interval of time. However, whereas I
view that as a problem to be overcome through (conservative) modification
of the formalism, Prof. Fleming appears to view this feature as somehow
constitutive of quantum theory, writing:
QM is a theory of temporally persistent dynamical systems, in-
deed of eternal systems which live in a fixed classical space-time.
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. . . The basic observables of standard QM . . . are designed to an-
swer questions about . . . possible properties of persistent physical
systems at specified times (or, relativistically, on specified space-
like hypersurfaces). (His emphasis.)
On the other hand, I take the view that the time-dependent observables of
QM (and in particular position observables) should be thought to concern
the properties of events in whose production the system is involved, not the
properties of the system itself.
In order to draw out this contrast, let us consider the instantaneous
measurement of position of a system in state ψ at a particular time t, cor-
responding to the Heisenberg picture projection P∆(t) = UtP∆Ut. For Prof.
Fleming, the (pure) state ψ describes the (possible) properties of an eter-
nally persisting object, whose values are realized on measurement (according
to the conventional interpretation) or (according to the dynamical collapse
interpretation he favors) given (nearly) determinate values by a distinct
stochastic localization process.1 Regardless, what is being localized (and
what is correspondingly measured by P∆(t)) is a property of the system as
a whole, namely its location. According to his view, if we have a situation
in which 〈ψ|P∆(t)ψ〉 = 1, then this reveals the quantum system described
by ψ to be entirely located within the spatial region ∆ at time t.2 This view
leads to certain difficulties regarding relativistic localization, to which much
of Prof. Fleming’s work has been addressed.
In contrast, my view is that, ultimately, P∆(t) is to be understood in
terms of the location of a detection event within a suitable experimental ap-
paratus. (Think here of a diffraction experiment with a luminescent screen
or a Wilson cloud chamber.) Thus 〈ψ|P∆(t)ψ〉 = 1 is to be interpreted as
saying, with certainty, that such an event did occur located within ∆ at time
t. On this view, P∆(t) does not concern the location of the system entire,
conceived as a persisting material object, but rather the experimentally de-
terminable, spatio-temporally located events that occur in interaction of the
system in question with other physical systems, namely (in this case) the
experimental apparatus.3 We can call this view the event-first view of quan-
tum theory, in which the quantum state concerns the probabilities for the
1For some potential difficulties of thinking about quantum systems as persisting ob-
jects, see my ‘Do Quantum Objects Have Temporal Parts?,’ Philosophy of Science (forth-
coming).
2Note that this is precisely the interpretation adopted by Wightman (1962).
3To head off potential confusion, I do not mean to say that quantum theory concerns
only such events, or that the events in question need to be observable (in the sense of van
Fraassen, i.e., by human senses alone).
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occurrence of events, in contrast to the system-first view that Prof. Fleming
adopts, in which the quantum state concerns the (potential) properties of a
persisting object.
In this connection, let me quote Dirac’s remarks to the 1927 Solvay con-
ference regarding the interpretation of quantum theory, in which he famously
claimed that ‘Nature makes a choice.’ (It is important to note that Dirac
is here speaking before the establishment of “standard QM,” i.e. in advance
of Hilbert space methods having become commonplace.)
It is essential that the result of an experiment shall be a per-
manent record. The numbers that describe such a result must
help to not only describe the state of the world at the instant
the experiment is ended, but also help to describe the state of
the world at any subsequent time. These numbers describe what
is common to all the events in a certain chain of causally con-
nected events, extending indefinitely into the future. Take as
an example a Wilson cloud expansion experiment. The causal
chain here consists of the formation of drops of water round ions,
the scattering of light by these drops of water, and the action
of this light on a photographic plate, where it leaves a perma-
nent record. The numbers that form the result of the experiment
describe all of the events in this chain equally well and help to
describe the state of the world at any time after the chain began.
(Bacciagaluppi & Valentini, 2009, p. 447)
What do these ‘numbers’ (i.e. c-numbers) concern? I contend that they con-
cern (at least) the spatio-temporal location of the ionization event (brought
about by the quantum system in question) that set in motion the chain of
events leading to a permanent record of this outcome.4 On the events-first
view, the quantum state is to provide predictions of where these events are
located in space and in time.
Now, if the outcomes of this experiment are to be predicted by observ-
ables of the theory, then these observables had better assign probabilities to
the spatio-temporal location of these events. As I discussed in the paper,
it is hard to see how standard QM could do this if P∆(t) is interpreted as
supplying probabilities for the results of a measurement at time t. But Prof.
4While I do think that Dirac’s words here present an effective characterization of the
view I am advocating, his language of ‘causal connections’ should not be read as an
invocation of any philosophically-loaded notion of causation. Given Dirac’s self-described
contempt for philosophy, and generally instrumentalist bent, it is anyway unlikely that he
had such ideas in mind.
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Fleming suggests an alternative view of quantum theory, which differs from
the usual Schro¨dinger dynamics by the addition of an additional dynamical
process of stochastic state reduction. On this view, presumably, the appear-
ance of particle (or quanton) tracks in a cloud chamber (which, note, are not
continuous trajectories but a discontinuous series of sites of condensation) is
due to the repeated localization of the system (e.g. an alpha particle) and its
subsequent interaction with the water molecules; or, perhaps, the sponta-
neous localization of both water molecules and alpha particle brought about
by the stochastic localization process. Prof. Fleming notes that these spon-
taneous localizations are, like measurement in standard QM, to be thought
of as occurring instantaneously and at definite times. This leads to the view
that,
. . . there would be no question of measuring when the primordial
reductions occur and trying to measure just when a measure-
ment exploited reduction measurement exploited reduction oc-
curs (within the exploiting measurement) would be an instance
of measuring a case specific time observable.
However, on the event-first view, the theory already provides probabilities
for events to occur at particular times in particular locations (at least, when
supplied with appropriate observables), and so there is no need to introduce
an additional mechanism to bring about their occurrence. On the event-
first view, the spatio-temporal properties measured in an experiment are
not the properties of the system since it is the events that come to be
spatio-temporally located not ‘the system.’
Admittedly, the interpretation of event time POVMs in terms of con-
ditional probabilities for an event to occur at a particular time (given that
the event occur at some time) is not inconsistent with the idea that the
event in question is a “primodial reduction.” However, the probabilities
supplied by a dynamical collapse model would not (in general) meet the
required condition.5 And since these probabilities may be determined from
the Schro¨dinger equation (or the extended Schro¨dinger equation) without
introducing an additional stochastic process, there is simply no technical,
nor interpretative, need for such a process. That is, we need not imagine
that in, e.g., a cloud chamber ionization two separate events occur: first the
state reduction and then the ionization. The event-first view maintains that
5It may be objected that it is only under special circumstances that such probabilities
apply, but note that experimental arrangements are often chosen so as to expressly provide
these circumstances.
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in reality there is a single thing that occurs at some time in a particular spa-
tial location: the ionization event (which is followed by certain other events
which together comprise the collection of water molecules observed by the
human eye).
I conclude this section by addressing Prof. Fleming’s skepticism regard-
ing the experimental realization of the time of arrival operator that we both
consider. He complains that the statistics of such an operator concern ar-
rival at a point (or plane) and require an experiment to run for all (eternal)
time. An exactly analogous objection could equally be mounted to the
instantaneous measurement of the position observable: the statistics it sup-
plies concern an experiment that takes place over all of (infinite) space, and
which runs for a mere instant. Regarded as a description of an experiment
that takes place in a (spatially bounded) lab over some extended period of
time, we might equally call the position observable a “toy model too silly
for words.”
However, in neither case do I think the idealizations involved are partic-
ularly problematic, and we may allow the respective operators to provide an
(admittedly idealized) description of an experiment that could be performed
and repeated in a lab. Just as we do not think the position observable fails
to apply to such experiments due to the practical difficulties involved in
constructing infinitely large detectors that are sensitive at an instant, so
we should not think the time of arrival to be without experimental content
in the absence of detectors stretching across all of space, sensitive for the
entire history of the universe. Indeed, few diffraction experiments end with-
out multiple successful detections at a screen of limited (but finite) spatial
extent, sensitive over an extended period of time.
2 On the Underdetermination of POVMs
In the immediately preceding discussion of the time of arrival operator Ta,
I glossed over an important point: the measurement statistics for the time
of arrival are not provided by the time of arrival operator, but rather the
POVM (uniquely) associated with it. This is no less the case for position
since specifying the self-adjoint operator Q also serves to uniquely determine
a POVM, but in this case the POVM happens to be in addition a PVM.
Without yet going into the details, this is because, although Q and Ta are
each symmetric, only Q is self-adjoint.6 This association of Q with a PVM
rather than a POVM is thus guaranteed by the Spectral Theorem. I take
6A bounded operator A is symmetric iff 〈φ|Aψ〉 = 〈Aφ|ψ〉 for all ψ, φ ∈ H.
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Prof. Fleming’s worries, expressed in his §5, to be directed at the use of
POVMs that are not PVMs, and I take his major worry to be this: in moving
beyond the usual association of self-adjoint operators with observables of the
theory we break the one-to-one correspondence of operators with PVMs, and
so run the risk of (i) underdetermation of the POVM by the specification of
a particular operator, and so (ii) vesting the mere mathematical definition
of a POVM with undeserved physical significance.
First, let me clear up a terminological distinction that, although present
in Prof. Fleming’s explication, is not given sufficient emphasis. In this con-
text, a Positive Operator Valued Measure is essentially a map from a collec-
tion of measurable subsets of R to a set of positive operators on a Hilbert
space H.7 Nowhere does Prof. Fleming explicitly define such a map. He
chooses instead to consider what are known as generalized resolutions of the
identity, his (12).8 Now, the relationship between these and the associated
POVM is very close (as he indicates): if Pˆ (x) is a generalized resolution
of the identity and ∆ is a measurable subset of R (an open set of points x





is the positive operator associated with ∆, and ∆ 7→ E∆ is the POVM
defined by Pˆ (x).
What Prof. Fleming calls the “broad approach” is, I believe, fairly stan-
dard in the literature he discusses, and takes as its starting point the as-
sumption that the POVM ∆ 7→ E∆ provides all the relevant experimental
information. Adherents of the broad approach would, therefore, prefer to
pick out the POVM corresponding to a particular physical parameter or
experimental situation uniquely by means of physically motivated symme-
try requirements. The association of a POVM with a symmetric operator
via its first moment is thus of lesser importance, and one would not nec-
essarily need to consider such an operator in using the POVM to provide
the statistics for a given measurement situation. I would not call this the
broad approach, but rather the POVM-first approach, in contrast to the
operator-first approach that Prof. Fleming appears to prefer.9
7Positive operators E have a real spectrum and have the property that 〈φ|Eφ〉 ≥ 0 for
all φ ∈ H. A projection P 2 = P , with spectrum {0, 1}, is obviously a positive operator.
8See, e.g., Alkhiezer & Glazman (1993, p. 121).
9Note that an adherent of the POVM first approach need not be committed to the
use of POVMs that are not also PVMs (and thus uniquely associated with self-adjoint
operators)—she could still maintain that it is just those POVMs that are PVMs which
have physical significance.
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To give a concrete example, consider Wightman’s (1962) classic anal-
ysis of localization. Rather than defining a self-adjoint position operator,
Wightman assumes the existence of a PVM whose assignment of projections
to spatial regions covaries with translations under a unitary representation
of the Euclidean group. The major achievement of the paper is the proof
that a PVM is uniquely defined by this requirement (along with some other
symmetry and regularity conditions) in both Galilei and Poincare´ invariant
quantum theory. Having done so, we are able to see that the self-adjoint
operators that these PVMs define are none other than the usual position op-
erator (or the Newton-Wigner operator in the relativistic case). But Wight-
man’s physical interpretation is given in terms of the PVM: in this case P∆
supplies the probability that the system is found to be located in the region
∆.10 In posing this ‘experimental question’ it is not the position observable
Q that is measured but the projection P∆. So already, without going beyond
the set of PVMs, there may be good reasons to view the POVM as more
physically significant than its first moment.
The reason it is necessary to go beyond PVMs when defining case spe-
cific time POVMs is that the symmetry that one expects such POVMs to
respect—time translation covariance—cannot be obeyed by a PVM (this is
implied by ‘Pauli’s theorem’). It is for this reason that one must go beyond
the set of PVMs in defining probabilities for the occurrence of events in
time. From this perspective—according to which the POVM takes center
stage—the failure of the second moment of the POVM to equal the square of
time operator (Fleming’s (19)) only serves to indicate that the time operator
is of minor interest, and one’s attention is best devoted to the underlying
POVM. From this perspective, there is no need to worry about the failure of
a (non-maximally) symmetric operator to uniquely determine a POVM since
one already has the POVM in hand, which was picked out independently by
symmetry requirements. From this perspective, there is no problem of un-
derdetermination of POVM by symmetric operator, since there is no need to
determine the POVM from the symmetric operator: instead, the symmetric
operator is picked out by the POVM. Moreover, as Fleming acknowledges,
the underdetermination problem he raises through his equation (20) does
not, according to his (21), lead to any empirical difference: what is signifi-
cant is that Ta is the first moment of the relevant POVM; the fact that it is
also the first moment of other POVMs is irrelevant.
Nonetheless, let us consider the problem from the ‘narrow’ perspective
10In the previous section I suggested that P∆ is better conceived as concerning the
location of a detection event rather than the entire system.
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that begins with a symmetric operator and seeks the associated POVM. Ev-
ery POVM specifies a symmetric operator on H as its first moment (Werner,
1986, Prop. 3, p. 796).11 Given a symmetric operator S on H there are
(generally speaking) three possibilities: either S has a unique self-adjoint
extension (it is essentially self-adjoint), or S has many self-adjoint exten-
sions, or S has no self-adjoint extension (it is thus maximally symmetric).12
In the first case, S corresponds to a unique PVM. In the second case, S
corresponds non-uniquely to many PVMs. In the third case, S corresponds
uniquely to a POVM (as Prof. Fleming acknowledges). Thus it is unclear
how the underdetermination worry (regarding POVMs, remember) is going
to get traction: according to this classification, there is only underdetermi-
nation in the second case, which involves a non-uniqueness of PVMs, not
POVMs.13
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